

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O R 210535Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9851

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JAKARTA 10244

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PO, PT, ID, AS

SUBJECT: INDONESIA & PORTUGUESE TIMOR

REF: STATE 194779

1. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR WAS CALLED BY GENERAL YOGA OF BAKIN AUGUST 20 FOR REVIEW OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION. DENYING ANY BAKIN INVOLVEMENT IN CURRENT SITUATION YOGA STRESSED THAT IN INDONESIAN VIEW RESPONSIBILITY REMAINED WITH PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT. INDONESIAN POSITION REMAINED THAT IT WOULD UNDERTAKE NO PROVOCATIONS OR MILITARY OPERATIONS UNLESS SHE FEELS ENDANGERED AND IF SO INDONESIA WILL PRODUCE PROOF. YOGA RAISED POSSIBILITY UDT MAY ASK FOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AND PORTUGUESE MIGHT ASK INDONESIA TO INTERVENE. AMBASSADOR OUTLINED US POSITION CAUTIONING REGARDING US ATTITUDE IN EVENT OF INDONESIAN MILITARY ACTION BUT STATING US WOULD NOT OBJECT TO PEACEFUL INCORPORATION. END SUMMARY.

2. BAKIN CHIEF, LT. GENERAL YOGA SUGOMO, INVITED AMBASSADOR TO BAKIN HEADQUARTERS AFTERNOON AUGUST 20 FOR REVIEW OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION. YOGA TERMED DISCUSSION OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE NOTES AND TO DISCUSS HOW BEST TO PROCEED. REFERRING TO CONTACTS WITH OTHER DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES ON THE SAME TOPIC EARLIER HE APOLOGIZED FOR DELAYING REVIEW WITH  
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THE AMBASSADOR.

3. SOMEWHAT JOCLARLY YOGA REMARKED THAT BAKIN AND CIA HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF ENGINEERING RECENT EVENTS IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. HE WISHED AMBASSADOR TO KNOW THAT HE HAD NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH RECENT EVENTS AND HE WAS SHOCKED TO HEAR OF THEM WHEN THEY OCCURRED. THERE WAS CLEAR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PORTUGUESE AND INDONESIAN GOVERNMENTS (HE LATER AMENDED THIS TO THE FORMER PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT) THAT DECOLONIZATION IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN MANNER REFLECTING WILL OF PEOPLE AND WITHOUT DISTURBING POLITICAL STABILITY OF AREA. GOI HAD INSISTED AND GOP HAD AGREED THAT THE PORTUGUESE HAD MORAL OBLIGATION TO PREPARE PEOPLE OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR FOR END OF PORTUGUESE SOVEREIGNTY THERE. GOI HAD FURTHER AGREED TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, IF ASKED, TO HELP IMPLEMENT WILL OF THE PEOPLE. THERE HAD BEEN GREAT OPTIMISM ON PART OF GOI THAT WITH OR WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF GOI A PEACEFUL REFERENDUM COULD BE HELD. HOWEVER, UDT, SUPPORTED BY "CERTAIN GROUPS," HAD RESORTED TO SHOW OF FORCE INVITING COUNTER-ACTION WHICH COULD OPEN DOORS TO TROUBLE IN ENTIRE REGION.

4. GENERAL YOGA OUTLINED THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS. FIRST, IF UDT PROVES SUCCESSFUL IN FIRST PHASE OF ITS SHOW OF FORCE, THEN FRETILIN MUST REACT AND APODETI WOULD INEVITABLY BE DRAWN INTO CONFLICT. THIS COULD CREATE CHAOTIC SITUATION OFFERING WIDE RANGING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUTSIDE POWERS TO HAVE DIRECT OR INDIRECT INFLUENCE ON OUTCOME. THESE OUTSIDE POWERS CERTAINLY WILL NOT BE U.S. OR BRITAIN, BUT COULD VERY WELL BE SOVIETS OR CHINESE. THIS CONFORMS TO BAKIN'S ANALYSIS OF SOVIET STRATEGY. SECONDLY, IF UDT HAS UNDERTAKEN THIS ACTION IN CONCERT WITH GROUPS IN POWER IN PORTUGAL--AND ORIGINAL STRATEGY OF THE UDT WAS TO REMAIN WITHIN THE PROTECTION OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT--THEN FUTURE POSTURE OF INDEPENDENT PORTUGUESE TIMOR LINKED TO POLITICAL GROUPS IN PORTUGAL CAN NOT POSSIBLY BE NEUTRAL. THIRD, IF UDT AND APODETI HAD UNTIED TO FIGHT AGAINST FRETILIN THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING TO GOI. BUT OPPOSITE HAS HAPPENED, AND UDT IS TRYING TO COMBINE WITH FRETILIN MINUS ITS LEFTIST LEADERSHIP AND SPODETI MEMBERS ARE FLEEING TO INDONESIAN TIMOR.

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5. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ABOUT PRESENT COMPOSITION OF UDT LEADERSHIP, YOGA SAID WHOLE LEADERSHIP OF UDT WAS INVOLVED IN PRESENT SITUATION, BUT THEY ARE NOT ALONE AND HAVE ARMS. LOCAL TROOPS HAVE BEEN SOURCE OF SOME ARMS, BUT UNARMED UDT MEMBERS COULD NOT HAVE OVERRUN POLICE HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT PERMISSION OF PORTUGUESE OFFICIALS.

6. IN ATTEMPTING TO COMPARE SITUATION IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR

WITH THAT IN PORTUGAL, GENERAL YOGA LIKENED UDT TO SOCIALISTS AND FRETRELIN TO COMMUNISTS, BUT ASSERTED THAT SOCIALISTS WERE (IN LISBON) PRO-MOSCOW WHEREAS COMMUNISTS WERE PRO-PEKING AND ADDED THAT BAKIN HAD "PROOF" THAT UDT WAS INFLUENCED BY SOCIALIST GROUP. IN ANY EVENT, YOGA SAID GOI WAS CURRENTLY UNABLE TO CLARIFY SITUATION IN PORTUGAL, TO DETERMINE WHAT PRESENT PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT SEES AS ITS OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR OR HOW PORTUGUESE INTEND TO FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. YOGA SAID THAT FRANKLY GOI DID NOT KNOW WHO WAS IN POWER IN PORTUGAL AND SIMPLY CANNOT GET ANY ANSWERS OUT OF LISBON OR FROM ANY OF OTHER PORTUGUESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS IN MACAO, HONG KONG, NEW YORK, OR ELSEWHERE.

7. THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT WHILE OUR INFORMATION ON PORTUGUESE SITUATION ALSO SKETCHY, OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THAT PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS TEND TO MAINTAIN IDEOLOGICAL TIES WITH OTHER EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS RATHER THAN WITH MOSCOW, AND THAT RECENT ELECTION VICTORY AND CURRENT TRENDS ARE GENERALLY REGARDED AS NON-COMMUNIST, AS REFLECTED IN DIFFICULTY OF COMMUNISTS, PARTICULARLY IN NORTH; DISMISSAL OF COMMUNIST OFFICIALS, CIRCULATION OF ANTI-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, AND PRAVDA AND MOSCOW RADIO STATEMENT BLAMING WESTERN POWERS FOR CURRENT SITUATION. GENERAL YOGA MERELY REPEATED THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT SOCIALISTS WERE PRO-MOSCOW AND COMMUNISTS WERE PRO-CHINESE.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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8. AGAIN IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, YOGA ASSERTED FLATLY THAT UDT CONTROLS DILI, BUT ADDED THERE WAS APODETI AND FRETILIN RESISTANCE IN INTERIOR. HE CONFIRMED THAT PORTUGUESE MAJORS MOTA AND JONATAS HAD LEFT PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND WERE HURRYING BACK TO LISBON TO GIVE THEIR OWN VERSION OF EVENTS SO AS TO COUNTERVAIL OTHER REPORTING REACHING LISBON FROM PORTUGUESE TIMOR. YOGA ALSO REVEALED THAT PRESIDENTIAL AIDE MAJOR SOARES HAD NOT REACHED DILI AND WAS ON HIS WAY BACK TO LISBON. YOGA EXPLAINED THAT SOARES HAD ENTERED INDONESIA WITHOUT A VISA, THAT GOI HAD NO FOREWARNING OR EXPLANATION OF HIS PRESENCE. PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO SUPPORT HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WAS AN EMISSARY OF PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT, AND THAT WHILE GOI WAS ATTEMPTING TO CLARIFY THIS SOARES TRIED TO "SNEAK OUT" TO DENPASAR. SOARES CLAIMED TO HAVE LETTER FROM PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT BUT BAKIN HAD DETERMINED LETTER WAS NOT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT. SOARES WAS BELIEVED TO BE A MEMBER OF PORTUGUESE SOACIALIST GROUP.

9. YOGA ASKED FOR STATEMENT OF US POSITION ON PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT HE WAS IN A POSITION TO MAKE AN AUTHORITIVE STATEMENT BY VIRTUE OF INSTRUCTIONS RECENTLY RECEIVED. FIRST, US GOVERNMENT IS NOT ANXIOUS TO BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR IN ANY WAY. APART FROM NORMAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN FOR WELFARE OF POPULATION AND RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION, MAIN AMERICAN INTEREST IS IN IMPACT OF ANY CHANGE IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR ON US RELATIONS WITH  
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INDONESIA. SECONDELY, US GOVERNMENT HAS NO OBJECTION TO MERGER OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR WITH INDONESIA ASSUMING THIS IS DESIRED BY POPULACE. THIRDLY WE BEILIEVE ISSUE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY INHABITANTS AND TIMOR'S NEIGHBORS. THUS, PEACEFUL MERGER WOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEMS IN UNITED STATES. PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE IF THERE WAS A FORCEABLE SEIZURE. THIS COULD RAISE DIFFIVULTIES OF KIND BEING ENCOUNTERED WITH TURKEY ON QUESTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY IF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN USED. THIS STATEMENT WAS NOT INTENDED TO PRESSURE OUTCOME OF SITUATUON ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, BUT GOI SHOULD BE AWARE IF US EQUIPMENT WERE USED IN FORCEABLE SEIZURE OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR THIS COULD CALL INTO EFFECT SECTIONS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND COULD PLACE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN JEOPARDY. THUS, BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE PEACEFUL INCORPORATION OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR INTO INDONESIA.

10. AMBASSADOR INQUIRED WHETHER YOGA FELT PORTUGUESE COULD REASSERT CONTROL OR WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT PROVE POSSIBLE WITH LEADERSHIP GROUP IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

11. GENERAL YOGA SAID HE WANTED TO BE PERFECTLY CLEAR ON

THREE POINTS: FIRST, GOI WOULD NOT PROVOKE PRESENT SITUATION AND WILL NEVER LAUNCH PROVOCATIONS OR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST HER PEACEFUL NEIGHBORS. SECONDLY, INDONESIA IS NOT ABANDONING HER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. THIRDLY, IF INDONESIA HAS TO ACT SHE WILL ONLY DO SO IF SHE FEELS ENDANGERED AND PROVOKED, AND IF SO, INDONESIA WILL PRODUCE PROOF OF IT. INDONESIA PLACES TOO HIGH A VALUE OF HER FOREIGN RELATIONS TO RISK AGGRESSION, AND THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS GOI HAS ASKED THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

12. YOGA CONTINUED THAT THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE UDT HAS ASKED PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT TO PUT AN END TO PRESENT CONFRONTATION OF FORCES, BUT IF UDT DISCOVERS THAT GOP IS NOT WILLING TO INTERVENE UDT MAY THEN INVITE INTERVENTION BY FORCES IN NEIGHBORING REGION. IF THIS APPEAL IS NOT ANSWERED UDT MAY THEN ASK FOR INTERVENTION OF ANYONE WHO CAN RESTORE ORDER. THERE IS EVEN POSSIBILITY THAT PORTUGAL WILL SAY THAT SHE IS TOO FAR AWAY AND ASK INDONESIANS TO  
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RESTORE ORDER. INDONESIA MUST KNOW OPINIONS OF US GOVERNMENT, AS FOUR OR FIVE YEARS FROM NOW PORTUGUESE TIMOR MAY BE PRO-SOVIET OR PRO-CHINESE AND THEN PROBLEMS WILL NOT BE INDONESIA'S ALONE.

13. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WISHED TO CLARIFY HIS STATEMENTS ABOUT THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE GOI SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT DETERMINATION OF WHAT AMERICAN POSITION MAY BE DOES NOT REST ENTIRELY IN HANDS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE US GOVERNMENT. EXECUTIVE BRANCH MAY UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION, BUT ITS HANDS MAY BE TIED. THUS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY EXACTLY WHAT THE US REACTION WOULD BE. GENERAL YOGA RESPONDED, "WE KNOW."

14. AMBASSADOR INQUIRED ABOUT AUSTRALIAN POSITION. YOGA SAID IT WAS NOT TOO FAR FROM US POSITION, AND THAT AUSTRALIANS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT INDONESA STICKS TO HER PROMISES, IS NOT AN AGGRESSOR, BUT IF ENDANGERED WILL HAVE TO ACT, BUT WILL OFFER CLEAR PROOF OF DANGER.

15. AMBASSADOR INQUIRED IF THE GOI PERCEIVED THAT THE OPTION OF MERGER WITH INDONESIA HAD BECOME MORE POPULAR IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. YOGA REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE SO AND THAT ONLY APODETI SUPPORTED IT. YOGA WENT ON TO ASSERT PORTUGUESE TIMOR AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE SIMPLY DID NOT MAKE SENSE, EVEN THOUGH HE REALIZED THAT THERE ARE INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF 100,000 PERSONS OR LESS, BUT AN INDEPEDENT TIMOR WOULD HAVE TO LOOK FOR HELP SOMEPLACE AND COULD PROBABLY READILY GET AID FROM SOVIETS AND THEREBY

ALLOW THEM TO ESTABLISH A FOOTHOLD THERE.

16. AMBASSADOR ASKED IF GOI ASSESSES THAT SOVIETS VALUE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA MORE THAN AN ADVENTURE IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. YOGA DEPRECATED THIS, CALLING ATTENTION TO SOVIET ACTIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF ASIA AND AFRICA. AMBASSADOR INQUIRED IF GOI HAD CONSIDERED FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO PORTUGUESE TIMOR LEADERSHIP AS A FACTOR IN SITUATION. YOGA REPLIED THAT THE GOI HAD BEEN DOING SO, SUPPLYING WHEAT AND SUGAR, SOME WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND SOME WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT, BUT INDICATED THIS MUST STOP.

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17. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT US POSITION WAS CLEAR AND YOGA RESPONDED THAT IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR. NEWSOM

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